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ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS AND CALIFORNIA
LAW: BUILDING CONFIDENCEt
With the rising rate of divorce in American society, antenuptial
agreements have grown increasingly popular. In California, pro-
spective spouses find antenuptial agreements particularly useful to
avoid community property divisions in the event of divorce. The
majority of jurisdictions impose a fiduciary relationship on par-
ties entering into antenuptial agreements. California law, however,
has traditionally failed to recognize the close and trusting nature
of the parties' relationship, and instead has treated prospective
spouses as arm's-length adversaries. This Comment argues that
the California legislature should adopt the majority view, and
treat prospective spouses in a way reflective of reality, public pol-
icy, and intimations of the California Supreme Court.
INTRODUCTION
In 1849 a system of community property was officially instituted
in California.' Underlying community property law is the policy that
a husband and wife are partners, with equal ownership and manage-
rial rights in virtually all property acquired during marriage.2 The
goal of their partnership is a successful marriage; each spouse con-
tributes equally to that goal.' In light of this partnership concept,
t The author wishes to acknowledge the invaluable contribution of Christopher
Zopatti, a fellow USD law student, to the execution of this Comment. His word-
processing prowess, sense of humor, and friendly encouragement are greatly appreciated.
1. Vaughn, The Policy of Community Property and Inter-Spousal Transac-
tions, 19 BAYLOR L. REV. 20, 21 (1967). The concept of community property existed in
California prior to 1849, but the California Constitution of 1849 officially recognized the
system as California law. Id. at 21.
2. Id. at 26-27.
Since the policy of community property is one of equality of property rights
between husband and wife as to marital property acquisitions, its cardinal prin-
ciples are based upon the separate identity of each spouse and their mutuality of
interest in all marital property acquisitions, as opposed to the common law doc-
trine of the merger of the identity of the wife into that of the husband. Id. at 34.
3. Id. at 40-41.
In adopting a community of goods, the law. . . had regard for the industry and
common labor of each spouse and to the burdens of the partnership and
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California disregards any difference in the couple's separate
incomes,4 and community property is divided into two equal shares if
divorce occurs.5
A couple may, however, remove themselves from California's com-
munity property system by contract, either before or after the mar-
riage ceremony.6 California Civil Code section 51037 places a mar-
ried couple who contract with one another respecting property into a
"confidential relationship."8 Thus, each spouse is held to a high stan-
dard of fair dealing and full disclosure in transactions with each
other.9 When the couple transmutes1 ° community property into sepa-
rate property, each spouse must advise the other of his or her assets
and of any property rights being given up by the other partner."1 If
these requirements are not met, breach of the confidential relation-
ship will be presumed when the transmutation is challenged. 2 If this
presumption is not rebutted by contrary proof, all or part of the con-
tract will be unenforceable.13
In contrast, an engaged couple contracting with each other prior
to the marriage ceremony to avoid the community property system,
or to otherwise define their marital property rights, is not given the
protection of the "confidential relationship" presumption of section
community of interest. With the feeling in mind that during marriage the time
and attention of husband and wife should be directed toward furthering the
goals - economic, moral, social-of the marriage, the community was organ-
ized as the most suitable vehicle for accomplishing these goals. Id. at 34.
4. Id. at 55.
5. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800 (West 1985).
6. Barker v. Barker, 139 Cal. App. 2d 206, 212, 293 P.2d 85, 90 (1956).
7. (a) Subject to subdivision (b), either husband or wife may enter into any
transaction with the other, or with any other person, respecting property, which
either might if unmarried. (b) Except as provided in Sections 143, 144, and 146
of the Probate Code, in transactions between themselves, a husband and wife
are ... subject to the general rules which control the actions of persons occupy-
ing confidential relations with each other, as defined by Title 8 (commencing
with Section 2215) of Part 4 of Division 3.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 5103 (West Supp. 1985). Probate Code sections 143, 144, and 146
concern contractual arrangements relating to rights at death. CAL. PROB. CODE § 143,
144, 146 (West 1985).
8. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5103 (West 1985).
9. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2228 (West 1985); Wenke & O'Hare, Antenuptial
Agreements: Litigating Their Validity Upon Dissolution of Marriage, 6 ORANGE
COUNTY B.J. 216, 228-29 (1979).
10. "'Transmutation' is a generic term that describes ... contractual and dona-
tive transactions between [husband] and [wife] changing the character of property from
separate to community or vice versa." W. REPPY. COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN CALIFORNIA
29 (1980).
11. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 30
(1968).
12. Shapiro, Antenuptial Agreements and California Law, 9 BEv. HILLS BJ.,
Sept.-Oct. 1975, 76, 79.
13. See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text. See also Wenke & O'Hare,
supra note 9, at 219.
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5103.1 California, unlike the majority of jurisdictions, 5 considers a
betrothed couple to be dealing at arm's length."6 Thus, when an an-
tenuptial agreement is challenged for fraud, misrepresentation, or
other formation defects, the parties are not held to the same high
standards of fairness attending postnuptial property contracts. 17
In 1977, however, the California Supreme Court suggested in a
footnote in Marvin v. Marvin8 that in certain instances a confiden-
tial relationship may arise between an unmarried couple; thus, they
would be subject to the fiduciary duties of fair dealing and full dis-
closure when contracting with one another.19 This Comment will ex-
amine the validity of California's "arm's-length"20 analysis of ante-
nuptial agreements, in light of Marvin's implied extension of the
"confidential relationship" presumption.
Further, this Comment will compare the majority and California
views, focusing on protection of the parties and their ability to fulfill
contractual expectations. The prospective spouses' relationship, pub-
lic policy, and the Marvin trend are advanced as factors in support
of abandoning the California view. The need for clear guidelines in
negotiating and drafting antenuptial agreements and the importance
of contractual certainty are also offered in support of this position.
Ultimately, this Comment argues that the California legislature
should take action in this uncertain legal area before it is completely
overridden by the judiciary. It is therefore proposed that Civil Code
section 5103 be amended to protect not only spouses but also pro-
spective spouses who contract with each other regarding marital
property."
14. Handley v. Handley, 113 Cal. App. 2d 280, 285, 248 P.2d 59, 62 (1952);
Fernandez v. Fernandez, 194 Cal. App. 2d 782, 791, 15 Cal. Rptr. 374, 379 (1961).
15. Branca & Steinberg, Antenuptial Agreements Under California Law and In
re Marriage of Dawley, 11 U.S.F.L. REV. 317, 330-31 n. 65 (1977).
16. 113 Cal. App. 2d at 285, 248 P.2d at 62; 194 Cal. App. 2d at 791, 15 Cal.
Rptr. at 379. See also In re Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal. 3d 342, 352, 551 P.2d 323,
331, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3, 11 (1976).
17. 113 Cal. App. 2d at 285, 248 P.2d at 62; 194 Cal. App. 2d at 791, 15 Cal.
Rptr. at 379.
18. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1977). See infra text
accompanying notes 126-31.
19. 18 Cal. 3d at 682 n.22, 557 P.2d at 121 n.22, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 830 n.22.
20. See Shapiro, supra note 12, at 79.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 110-39.
ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS: CHANGING TIMES
As divorce rates rise, antenuptial agreements grow increasingly
popular.22 The frequent use of antenuptial agreements reflects the
realization that marriage is not necessarily "til death do us part"2 3
and the desire to minimize financial risks when marrying.24 Because
California is a community property state,25 all real or personal prop-
erty acquired by either spouse during marriage28 will be subject to
division in equal shares should dissolution of the marriage27 occur.28
Antenuptial agreements often enable the parties to a marriage to
retain their individual earnings and property acquired during the
marriage as separate property at dissolution.29
Antenuptial agreements serve two major purposes: (1) to order the
prospective spouses' property, earnings, and expenses in a way that
prevents later claims; and (2) to articulate their expectations as to
interpersonal relationships and the means of carrying out those ex-
pectations.30 Thus, antenuptial agreements are "as much a matter of
contract law as they are a creature of family law." 31
The legality of antenuptial agreements has long been recognized
in California: "Parties contemplating marriage may validly contract
as to their property rights, both as to property then owned by them
and as to property, including earnings, which may be acquired by
them after marriage." 32 Prenuptial contracts33 are favored by public
policy, as long as their terms do not encourage or promote divorce. 4
22. Branca & Steinberg, supra note 15, at 344.
23. In re Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal. 3d 342, 352, 551 P.2d 323, 329, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 3, 9 (1976).
24. Moore, The Enforceability of Premarital Agreements Contingent Upon Di-
vorce, 10 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 11, 14 (1983).
25. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5100 (West 1985).
26. There are three statutory exceptions to the community property classification.
Property acquired while living separate and apart from one another, property acquired
by one spouse by gift, bequest, devise, or descent, and any rents, issues, and profits from
separate property are deemed separate property. Additionally, property acquired before
marriage or after dissolution is separate property. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 5107, 5108,
5110, 5118 (West 1985). Moreover, the couple must be domiciled in California for Cali-
fornia's community property classification to apply. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5110 (West 1985).
27. The term "dissolution," as used in this Comment, includes both divorce and
death as ways in which a marriage might end.
28. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800 (West 1985).
29. Branca & Steinberg, supra note 15, at 318.
30. 1 C. MARKEY, CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAW PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 125(3) (7th ed. Supp. 1984). See also Branca & Steinberg, supra note 15, at 318
("Indeed, it is the very purpose of antenuptial agreements to exclude the operation of the
usual property rules.").
31. Wenke & O'Hare, supra note 9, at 217.
32. Barker v. Barker, 139 Cal. App. 2d 206, 212, 293 P.2d 85, 90 (1956).
33. The terms antenuptial agreement, prenuptial contract, and premarital con-
tract will be used interchangeably throughout this Comment.
34. Branca & Steinberg, supra note 15, at 328; In re Marriage of Dawley, 17
Cal. 3d 342, 353, 551 P.2d 323, 329, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3, 9 (1976). "A prenuptial contract
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For example, the agreement may not contain provisions limiting or
waiving spousal support obligations imposed by law.15 The formal
requirements for antenuptial agreements are that they be in writing
and that they be acknowledged by each party.36 Further, if any real
property is affected by the contract, recordation is required. 37
Typically, cases in which the validity of antenuptial agreements is
disputed involve older parties, previously divorced or widowed, at
least one of whom has children.38 Having been married before, the
parties more readily recognize the possibility and potential conse-
quences of an end to their marriage.39 Thus, contractual provisions
respecting property are made to benefit children from previous mar-
riages by preventing a new spouse's claim, or to avoid community
property divisions should divorce occur."0
Frequently, the wife challenges the antenuptial agreement when
the marriage ends, claiming that the more legally and financially as-
tute husband 4' used undue influence to obtain her consent to the
agreement.42 Other typical claims are that the husband did not dis-
close the true value of his assets,43 or that the wife waived valuable
property rights-perhaps inheritance or probate homestead
rights-unknowingly.44 As will be discussed, the difference in
freely and intelligently made is generally regarded as conducive to marital tranquility
and the avoidance of disputes about property in the future." Friedlander v. Friedlander,
80 Wash. 2d 293, 298, 494 P.2d 213 (1972).
35. 17 Cal. 3d 342 at 351, 551 P.2d at 328, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 8; 139 Cal. App. 2d
at 211-12, 293 P.2d at 90.
36. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5134 (West 1985).
37. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5135 (West 1985). However, in the absence of recordation,
the agreement will still be enforceable between the parties. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1217
(West 1985). Thus, the recordation requirement is of importance only to third parties.
38. Haskell, The Premarital Estate Contract and Social Policy, 57 N.C.L. REV.
415, 436-37 (1979). See Moore, supra note 24, at 11; Clark, Antenuptial Contracts, 50
U. COLO. L. REV. 141 (1979).
39. Clark, supra note 33, at 141.
40. See Haskell, supra note 38, at 436-37.
41. Id. at 417. "Unquestionably such bargaining imbalance reflecting the tradi-
tional economic dependence of the female has influenced the courts to require an open-
ness in the making of the contract which is not required between parties bargaining at
arm's length." Id. at 418. This Comment recognizes the advances in economic status
made by women in recent years. For conclusions differing from those of Professor Has-
kell, see Moore, supra note 24, at 16; H. CLARK, CASES AND PROBLEMS ON DOMESTIC
RELATIONS 726 (3d ed. 1980); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CUR-
RENT POPULATION REPORTS SPECIAL STUDIES SERIES P-23, No. 112.
42. Kosik v. George, 253 Or. 15, 452 P.2d 560 (1969). For a discussion of undue
influence and other formation defects see Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School District, 246 Cal.
App. 2d 123, 54 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1966).
43. 253 Or. at 15, 452 P.2d at 560.
44. 1 C. MARKEY, supra note 30, at § 2.64(1).
analysis between California and the majority of other jurisdictions in
such cases is striking."5
THE MAJORITY CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP PRESUMPTION
In analyzing prenuptial contract disputes, the majority of jurisdic-
tions presume that the parties are in a confidential and fiduciary
relationship.46 "[P]arties to an antenuptial agreement do not deal at
arm's length. Their relationship is one of mutual trust and confi-
dence. They must exercise the highest degree of good faith, candor
and sincerity in all matters bearing on the proposed agreement. 47
Thus, under the majority view, an antenuptial agreement is not ana-
lyzed as though it were an arm's-length commercial transaction.
In effect, whenever one party to the agreement gains an advantage
over the other party, the majority view presumes that fiduciary obli-
gations of fair dealing and full disclosure have been breached.48 If
one party improves his or her position, acquires a favorable opportu-
nity, or otherwise benefits from the antenuptial agreement, he or she
has obtained an advantage. 49 The agreement, therefore, will be sub-
ject to strict judicial scrutiny for lack of openness or fairness in its
formation.50
Reduced to its simplest terms, the "confidential relationship" pre-
sumption means that in certain factual situations emitting a "fra-
grance of fraud," ' the burden is on the non-rescinding party to es-
tablish full disclosure and fair dealing. For example, where the
agreement's provisions for the intended wife are wholly dispropor-
tionate to the future husband's wealth and the wife later seeks its
rescission, the husband will have the burden of proving that he fully
disclosed the nature, extent, and value of his assets to his then
45. See infra text accompanying notes 46-98.
46. Branca & Steinberg, supra note 15, at 330 n. 65. "Confidential and fiduciary
relations are, in law, synonymous, and may be said to exist whenever trust and confi-
dence is reposed by one person in the integrity and fidelity of another." Estate of Cover,
188 Cal. 133, 143, 204 P. 583, 593 (1922).
47. 2 A. LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS§ 90-41 (rev. ed. 1967). See Branca & Steinberg, supra note 15, at 333. See also Fried-
lander v. Friedlander, 80 Wash. 2d 293, 298, 494 P.2d 208, 213 (1972).
48. 1 C. MARKEY, supra note 30, at § 1.47(3). This presumption arises from the
trusting nature of the parties' relationship.
[P]ersons entering into such a contract are in a fiduciary relationship. The party
giving up an interest is placing trust in the other party and expecting him or her
not to abuse that trust. Since it would be easy for the person retaining the
greater interest to abuse the trust placed in him, we require that person to prove
he has provided the other with full and fair information before entering into the
antenuptial agreement.
Estate of Serbus v. Serbus, 324 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 1982).
49. 1 C. MARKEY, supra note 30, at § 1.47(3).
50. See Juhasz v. Juhasz, 134 Ohio St. 257, 260, 16 N.E.2d 328, 331 (1938);
Kosik v. George, 253 Or. 15, 18, 452 P.2d 560, 563 (1969).
51. J. JACKSON, CONTRACT LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 426 (1973).
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fiancee, or that she already had this knowledge when she signed the
agreement. 52 The suspect provisions of the agreement will be held
invalid as a matter of law unless he can meet that burden.53
Applying the Majority Analysis
Applying the above analysis in Wylie v. Wylie,54 the Supreme
Court of Arkansas refused to enforce an antenuptial agreement
wherein the wife agreed to receive $50,000 upon the death of her
husband in lieu of any claims, rights, or interests she might have
against his estate. Following his death, Mrs. Wylie demonstrated
that her husband's estate exceeded $475,000, when the agreement
was signed, and she challenged the agreement's validity.5 5 The bur-
den of proof, therefore, rested with those seeking enforcement to
show that she knew or should have known of his wealth when she
signed the agreement.56
Although evidence presented by the proponents demonstrated
Mrs. Wylie's education, business acumen, and knowledge of Mr.
Wylie's reputation in the community, the court held that even if she
had known he was wealthy, she could not have known the extent of
his wealth. 57 The lack of any proof as to Mr. Wylie's frankness and
candor in dealing with his fiancee prior to marriage was a critical
omission from the proponents' argument.5 8 Because satisfaction of
this element was not proved, the antenuptial agreement failed.59
The burden of proof attending the "confidential relationship" pre-
sumption is not as cumbersome as it might seem. For example, in
Estate of Serbus v. Serbus,6 0 the plaintiff-wife consented in an ante-
nuptial agreement to her husband's will, which would leave her
$4,000, a life estate in the homestead and its furnishings, and funds
for an adequate funeral.61 The trial court found that Mr. Serbus had
52. 134 Ohio St. at 260, 16 N.E.2d at 331; 253 Or. at 18, 452 P.2d at 563.
53. See supra note 52. In some circumstances the entire agreement may be inval-
idated, when the defective provisions are inseparable from the entire agreement.
54. 249 Ark. 316, 459 S.W.2d 127 (1970).
55. Id. at 317, 459 S.W.2d at 128.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 318, 459 S.W.2d at 129-30. Compare In re Borton's Estate, 393 P.2d
808 (Wyo. 1964) (it was sufficient that the wife knew her husband was rich, even though
she did not know the extent of his wealth).
58. 249 Ark. at 320, 459 S.W.2d at 131-32.
59. Id. at 320, 459 S.W.2d at 132.
60. 324 N.W.2d 381 (Minn. 1982).
61. Id. at 383.
a net worth of approximately $148,000 at the time of the marriage."
His attorney testified at the probate proceedings that although he
had informed Mrs. Serbus of her statutory inheritance rights before
she signed the prenuptial contract, he had not described his client's
property to her.6" Mrs. Serbus could have received approximately
$300,000 if permitted to take against the will or if no valid will had
existed.64
The Supreme Court of Minnesota declared that the $4,000 and
life estate agreed to in the antenuptial agreement constituted inade-
quate consideration.6" Thus, fraud in the formation process was pre-
sumed.6 However, the proponent of the agreement was able to rebut
this presumption by showing that Mrs. Serbus knew the extent of
her husband's property when she signed the antenuptial agreement.6 7
The proponent accomplished this with the drafting attorney's testi-
mony and the written terms of the agreement, which included the
statement by Mrs. Serbus that she was "familiar with the nature
and extent of the estate of James J. Serbus, Sr."68
The Serbus case demonstrates that where fulfillment of the fiduci-
ary obligations can be proven, the "confidential relationship" pre-
sumption does not present an insurmountable obstacle to the en-
forcement of antenuptial agreements. Thus, placing the burden of
proof with the non-rescinding party does not necessarily decide the
outcome of a particular dispute, although it does import intense
scrutiny of the formation process by the judiciary.
CALIFORNIA'S VIEW
The rule in California is contrary to the majority view. Under Cal-
ifornia law, parties to antenuptial agreements deal at arm's length.6"
Admittedly, where fair dealing70 is lacking, the law of contracts pro-
vides that the agreement will be unenforceable. 71 However, even
where the provisions made for one party's benefit are vastly
62. Id.
63. Id.




68. Id. at 383.
69. Handley v. Handley, 113 Cal. App. 2d 280, 285, 248 P.2d 59, 62 (1952);
Fernandez v. Fernandez, 194 Cal. App. 2d 782, 791, 15 Cal. Rptr. 374, 379 (1961). See
also In re Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal. 3d 342, 352, 551 P.2d 323, 331, 131 Cal. Rptr.
3, 11 (1976).
70. "Fair dealing" is comprised of full disclosure, knowing waiver, lack of undue
influence, and adequate consideration. See Branca & Steinberg, supra note 15, at 330-
31; Estate of Cantor, 39 Cal. App. 3d 544, 548-49, 114 Cal. Rptr. 160, 163 (1974);
Handley v. Handley, 113 Cal. App. 2d at 284-85, 248 P.2d at 62 (1952).
71. Branca & Steinberg, supra note 15, at 330.
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disproportionate to the financial means of the other party, there is no
shift in the burden of proof. 2 This is the most problematic aspect of
California's arm's-length analysis. The adverse consequences to indi-
vidual parties, and to the law of antenuptial agreements in general,73
flow directly from the failure to shift the burden of proving proce-
dural fairness.
The challenger of an antenuptial agreement, as opposed to the
party advantaged by it, has the burden of proving any formation de-
fects, including lack of fair dealing. In circumstances where the re-
scinding party is not the initiator of the agreement, he or she may
encounter extreme difficulty in producing proof of nondisclosure, du-
ress, or undue influence7 4 sufficient to justify a court's invalidation of
the agreement. Moreover, because independent legal advice is not
essential to the contract's validity,75 and drafting counsel is not likely
to testify that fraud occurred, the challenger's dilemma becomes
more acute.
The burden of proof does shift in the case of married contractors,
however, where formation defects are shown.76 Under California
Civil Code section 510 3, 77 a confidential relationship exists between
a husband and wife when they contract with each other. This confi-
dential relationship gives rise to certain fiduciary duties, the breach
of which constitutes constructive fraud.7 8 Because parties to a pre-
marital contract are by definition not yet married, neither section
5103 7 nor the corresponding fiduciary duties apply to them." Thus,
72. Wenke & O'Hare, supra note 9, at 228. See also In re Marriage of Dawley,
17 Cal. 3d 342, 355, 551 P.2d 323, 336, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3, 16 (1976).
73. See infra text accompanying notes 74-81, 106-12 & 115-21.
74. 1 C. MARKEY, supra note 30, at § 2.62(2).
75. Nagle v. Valadez, 202 Cal. App. 2d 51, 55, 20 Cal. Rptr. 548, 552 (1962).
See Wenke & O'Hare, supra note 10, at 229; Estate of Sayegh, 118 Cal. App. 2d 327,
257 P.2d 995 (1953).
76. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5103 (West 1985). See Norris v. Norris, 50 Cal. App. 2d
726, 733, 123 P.2d 847 (1942) (if the husband obtains any advantage over his wife, he
bears the burden of showing "that the transaction was fair and just and fully understood
by the party from whom the advantage was obtained"). This burden has been relaxed
somewhat by Probate Code §§ 140-47 where contractual relations between the spouses
relate to rights at death. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 140-47 (West 1985). See infra text accom-
panying notes 113-15.
77. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5103 (West 1985).
78. Wenke & O'Hare, supra note 9, at 328; CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1573(1), 1575(1)
(West 1985). See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 2235 (West 1985) (presumption of inadequate
consideration and undue influence where fiduciary obtains advantage from his beneficiary
in actions between them).
79. Branca & Steinberg, supra note 15, at 331; Handley v. Handley, 113 Cal.
App. 2d 280, 284-85, 248 P.2d 59, 62 (1952).
80. "[Tlhe standard imposed on one who is a trustee or fiduciary is an exacting
in cases involving identical transmutations, concealment or duress,
and resultant unfairness, it will be easier to find fraud or other for-
mation defects in a postnuptial contract than in an antenuptial
agreement."' This is the result of the line drawn between betrothal
and marriage in applying the fiduciary standards of section 5103.
Fernandez v. Fernandez
The case of Fernandez v. Fernandez82 illustrates this paradox. The
plaintiff-wife married the defendant-husband in a Mexican proceed-
ing when she was nineteen and he was forty-five. She had been
raised "in the old Spanish-the cloistered-sense. '83 Her mother
represented her throughout the marriage proceedings, 84 including ne-
gotiating the antenuptial agreement.85
Conflicting evidence was presented at trial as to whether the bride
was fully apprised of the nature, extent, and value of her husband's
property before she signed the agreement.8" Additionally, she
claimed she did not understand the effect of the agreement, which
was to declare separate property regimes.8 7 The defendant admitted
that the plaintiff was not present when the antenuptial agreement
was drafted 8 and that she did not have independent legal advice.89
Despite the disparity in the parties' ages and experience, the con-
flicting evidence, and the wife's lack of legal representation, the
court of appeals refused to shift the burden of proof to the husband.
The court's justification was a simple statement of the established
rule in California that no confidential relationship is presumed to
exist between premarital contractors."
The antenuptial agreement, in which the bride ultimately waived
her right to one-half of the marital property (amounting to
one, requiring standards of disclosure and fair dealing much more onerous than those
imposed upon persons dealing at arm's length." Shapiro, supra note 12, at 79.
81. 1 C. MARKEY, supra note 30, at § 2.62(2); CAL. CIV. CODE § 2230 (West
1985); Dimond v. Dimond, 103 Cal. 97, 37 P. 189 (1894); Comment, Property Settle-
ment Agreements, 35 S. CAL. L. REv. 174 (1962).
82. 194 Cal. App. 2d 782, 15 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1961).
83. Id. at 793, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 381 (citing Appellant's Reply Brief at 4).
84. Id. at 791, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 380.
85. Id. In Mexico, the law requires antenuptial agreements. Id. at 788-89, 15 Cal.
Rptr. at 378.
86. Id. at 792-93, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 379-80.
87. Id. at 789, 792, 15 Cal. Rptr. 377, 379. In Mexico, at the time of marriage,
the parties elect either to be "married under the regime of separate properties or conju-
gal society"; roughly, they decide whether to call each other's property community or
separate.
88. Appellant's Opening Brief at 13, Fernandez v. Fernandez, 194 Cal. App. 2d
782, 15 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1961).
89. Id.
90. 194 Cal. App. 2d at 782, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 380.
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approximately one million dollars at the time of the divorce)9' was
analyzed as an ordinary commercial contract. 92 Thus, the court of
appeals imposed no fiduciary obligations on the defendant, the
drafter and proponent of the agreement. 93
Lest the significance of the court's arm's-length approach be un-
derstated, the Fernandez antenuptial agreement should be analyzed
as though the majority "confidential relationship" view applied. In
Wylie v. Wylie,94 despite evidence showing the wife's business expo-
sure and knowledge of her husband's reputation as a wealthy man,
the proponents of the antenuptial agreement still had the burden of
proving Mr. Wylie's openness in making the contract.9 5 Arguably, if
the Fernandez court had applied the analysis used in Wylie, the out-
come would have been different. Mr. Fernandez's frankness and can-
dor with his bride were certainly in question9" because the bride's
mother negotiated the agreement. Evidence on this issue was
presented by both sides; however, because the court refused to im-
pose the "confidential relationship" presumption, resolution of the
full disclosure question did not affect the court's decision.9 Accord-
ing to the court, parties dealing at arm's length do not have to fully
disclose their assets.98
A Defensible Position?
Why California does not follow the majority view is unclear.99
While the judiciary's reluctance to usurp the legislative function in
this area may be fading, 00 California courts have traditionally
91. Id. at 789, 798, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 378, 384.
92. Id. at 790-91, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
93. Id. at 790, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
94. 249 Ark. 316, 459 S.W.2d 127 (1970).
95. Id. at 317, 459 S.W.2d at 128.
96. Id. at 318, 459 S.W.2d at 129.
97. 194 Cal. App. 2d 782, 790-91, 15 Cal. Rptr. 374, 377 (1961).
98. Id.
99. The legislative history of § 5103 gives no clue as to why prospective spouses
are excluded from the confidential relationship presumption; nor do any cases answer this
question sufficiently. For possible explanations, see infra text accompanying notes 103-
25.
100. See Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815
(1977). Marvin is the only case in which the court expressly recognizes a confidential
relationship between an unmarried couple, but only by way of a footnote. In Estate of
Nelson, 224 Cal. App. 2d 138, 36 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1964), the fiduciary duties arising
from a confidential relationship were applied to an antenuptial agreement. However, the
cases cited as authority in Nelson involved marital property agreements. It is not clear
whether the court was confused about the contractual status of engaged persons as op-
posed to married persons, or intended to expand the confidential relationship
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refused to place prospective spouses into a confidential relationship.
As in Fernandez v. Fernandez,0 1 the courts base their arm's-length
analysis of antenuptial agreements on the theory that the parties are
not married when the contract is signed and hence are not covered
by the language of section 5103.102
One reason for California's denial of the confidential relationship
between prospective spouses may be a desire to ensure stability of
contracts.' 03 Surely, if higher fiduciary standards are imposed on the
parties, antenuptial agreements might fail more often. Thus, Califor-
nia's legislature may fear that expanding section 5103 would inject
too much uncertainty into the favored enforceability of prenuptial
contracts. Antenuptial agreements reflect the parties' desire for or-
dered demarcations of property rights,104 and the couple's expecta-
tions, memorialized by the agreement, should not be subjected to
"constant attack."'10 5
If, however, public policy favors the institution of marriage, as the
Supreme Court of California claims, 1 6 perhaps a minimal sacrifice
of contractual stability should be made in support of this institution.
Furthermore, any instability caused by an expansion of section 5103
would be only temporary as the legal community would eventually
adjust to the more stringent fairness requirements for antenuptial
agreements. More importantly, expanding section 5103 could even
enhance contractual stability, as clearer guidelines for formation are
established. 0 7
Moreover, in light of the pro-marriage public policy, it is wrong to
consider the parties entering into marriage as arm's-length adversa-
ries. While the parties clearly seek to avoid financial risks, 08 their
engagement just as clearly demonstrates that they hold each other in
higher esteem and trust than they would if they were participating in
a commercial transaction.10 9
presumption.
I01. 194 Cal. App. 2d 782, 15 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1961).
102. Branca & Steinberg, supra note 15, at 331; Handley v. Handley, 113 Cal.
App. 2d 280, 284-85, 248 P.2d 59, 62 (1952).
103. Haskell, supra note 38, at 426.
104. See supra note 30.
105. 194 Cal. App. 2d at 790, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
106. 18 Cal. 3d at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831. "[Tjhe structure
of society itself depends upon the institution of marriage .... The joining of the man
and woman in marriage is at once the most socially productive and individually fulfilling
relationship that one can enjoy in the course of a lifetime." Id.
107. See infra text and accompanying notes 136-40.
108. Moore, supra note 24, at 14.
109. See Shapiro, supra note 12, at 80. "The process of contracting inevitably pits
one side against the other. When people are in love, they necessarily do not see, or do not
want to see themselves as adverse parties." Appellant's Reply Brief at 27, Marvin v.
Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1977).
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The extensive state regulation of marriage110 should begin when
two persons become engaged, if the pro-marriage public policy"' is
to be furthered. The parties to an antenuptial agreement are, after
all, contemplating marriage.1 1 2 Because marriage means that a con-
fidential relationship exists, the law in California should encourage
trust in that relationship by requiring the parties to act as fiduciaries
when they contract with marriage in mind.
Another reason for legislative inaction may be the belief that the
parties are adequately protected by other principles such as the com-
mon law doctrine of fraud. The legislature's recent amendment of
section 5103 may be indicative of this belief. Effective January 1,
1985, when a married couple makes contractual waiver arrange-
ments relating to rights at death, they are removed from the confi-
dential relationship imposed by section 5103.113 While fair and rea-
sonable disclosure and independent legal counsel are required in such
cases,1 4 it remains to be seen whether these provisions will be con-
strued to offer as much protection as the fiduciary standards of sec-
tion 5103. It is likely, however, that the legislature intended to relax
the procedural fairness requirements for such waiver arrangement,
as otherwise no change would have been made in section 5103. That
is, without the amendment, the fiduciary standards embodied in the
confidential relationship presumption of section 5103 would continue
to cover contractual waivers.
It is important to note that antenuptial agreements are excluded
from even these more relaxed waiver provisions.11 5 Thus, the
110. Branca & Steinberg, supra note 15, at 328 n.51. "The Family Law Act
makes marriage more attractive and more flexible by permitting the parties easier egress
from the relationship than existed before. But it still requires them to go through the
legal system in the hope that reconciliation can be effected." Respondent's Brief at 53,
Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1977).
111. The public policy favoring marriage has been variously stated, but it seems to
rest on three premises: 1. The social organization of the state is founded upon the marital
relation. 2. Personal morals require the preservation of its sanctity. 3. Since the union
can be dissolved only upon satisfaction of statutory requirements, a contract attempting
to short-circuit the prescribed process is fraud upon the state's interest in the marriage
contract. Note, Marriage, Contracts, and Public Policy, 54 HARV. L. REV. 473 (1941).
112. Barker v. Barker, 139 Cal. App. 2d 206, 212, 293 P.2d 85, 90 (1956). "The
ceremony of marriage, the various rules of property that attach to the relation, and the
accompanying legal duties and obligations encourage people to be very careful and to
have a real sense of commitment before going ahead." Respondent's Brief at 53, Marvin
v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1977).
113. CAL CIV. CODE § 5103 (West 1985); CAL PROB. CODE §§ 140-47 (West
1985).
114. CAL. PROB. CODE § 143 (West 1985).
115. CAL. PROB. CODE § 147(c) (West 1985).
legislature clearly seems to be leaving defects in the formation of
antenuptial agreements to the treatment of the common law. 116 As
previously stated, California courts do require knowing waiver of
marital property rights1 17 and procedural fairness'1 8 in the formation
process. Significantly, however, the burden of proof is not shifted
where these requirements are allegedly lacking; 1 9 hence, the chal-
lenger still must prove that fraud took place, and not just that the
other party obtained an advantage. Thus, whether the protection af-
forded by the common law is "adequate" depends on how one bal-
ances the freedom and stability of contracts with the above men-
tioned pro-marriage policy. Furthermore, lax standards for
premarital contracts often allow one party to avoid his or her marital
responsibilities (e.g., providing for the needy widow or widower),
which ultimately creates a burden on society120 and erodes the insti-
tution of marriage. 121
In advocating protection, one need not embrace paternalism. 122
Although not yet reflected in case law, the traditional bargaining im-
balance of women entering into antenuptial agreements has been
steadily diminished by their rise in economic independence. 123 This
improvement, however, does not negate the need for recognition of a
fiduciary relationship between prospective spouses. The ability to
protect one's own property interests while contracting with another
116. "[Tjhe validity and effect of ... premarital property agreement[s] shall be
determined by the law otherwise applicable to the premarital property agreement[s]."
CAL. PROB. CODE § 147(c) (West 1985).
117. See supra text accompanying note 70-71.
118. Id.
119. Branca & Steinberg, supra note 15, at 330-31 n.65; Shapiro, supra note 12,
at 79. Thus, even where knowing waiver and procedural fairness are shown to be lacking,
the challenger of the agreement still must prove that fraud or other invalidating circum-
stances actually existed.
120. Haskell, supra note 38, at 427. In other words, the state must then support
the needy widow. Of course, the rising economic independence of women (see infra text
accompanying notes 122-25) negates this fear to a degree, though not completely.
121. Id. at 437. A basic tenet of the institution of marriage, and a duty imposed by
law, is that each spouse is responsible for the welfare of the other. Thus, under California
statutory law, a husband and wife cannot alter contractually any of their legal relations
except those relating to property. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4802 (West 1985). Furthermore, a
"[h]usband and wife by marriage contract toward each other obligations of mutual re-
spect, fidelity and support." CAL. CIv. CODE § 5100 (West 1985).
122. "The pedestal upon which women have been placed has all too often, upon
closer inspection, been revealed as a cage." Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 20, 485
P.2d 529, 541, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 341 (1971). See Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of
Respondent, Lee Marvin, by Herma Hill Kay, Doris Brin Walker and John Sutter at 52,
Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1977).
123. Moore, supra note 24, at 16.
[W]ith more than half of all married women now employed outside the home,
and with women now comprising more than half of all college students, the dan-
ger of a divorced woman becoming a welfare burden appears to be significantly
less than was true in the days when the typical housewife was not expected or
equipped to work outside the home. Id.
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in whom trust is placed does not automatically accompany wealth
and education, for either men or women. Extending section 5103 to
prospective spouses would not spawn state guardianship; 124 rather, it
would impose greater responsibility and self-determination on the
parties. Simply stated, if they want their expectations to be more
certain of fulfillment and their antenuptial agreement to withstand
attack, the parties will have to deal openly with one another and not
treat marriage as a "business arrangement."' 12 5
SIGNS OF CHANGE: TROUBLESOME CONFUSION
In 1977, the California Supreme Court opened the door to the
"confidential relationship" presumption for unmarried couples in
Marvin v. Marvin.2 ' Of course, Marvin did not involve an antenup-
tial agreement, as the parties had no intention of ever marrying. 27
Rather, Michelle Marvin claimed that she and Lee Marvin, while
living together, had orally agreed to treat assets acquired during
their relationship as community property.' 28 At issue in Marvin was
whether partners in a meretricious relationship could validly contract
as to the disposition of their property.' 29 The California Supreme
Court answered this question affirmatively. 2 0
In a footnote, the Marvin court reasoned that "[ifn some instances
a confidential relationship may arise between nonmarital parties, and
economic transactions between them should be governed by the prin-
ciples applicable to such relationships."'' Thus, the court implicitly
expanded section 5103.132 Because the court did not limit its reason-
ing to unmarried cohabitants, its vague, "in some instances," termi-
124. In other words, the state would not be contracting for the parties or even
limiting their right to contract with each other.
125. Estate of Serbus v. Serbus, 324 N.W.2d 381, 384 (Minn. 1982).
126. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1977).
127. 18 Cal. 3d at 666 n.11, 557 P.2d at 117 n.11, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 826 n.11.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 670, 557 P.2d at 116, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 682 n.22. See also Estate of Sayegh, 118 Cal. App. 2d 327, 330-31,
257 P.2d 995, 997-98 (1953) (circumstances may warrant finding the existence of a con-
fidential relationship). But see In re Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal. 3d 342, 352, 551 P.2d
323, 333, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3, 11 (1976) (parties to an antenuptial agreement are not in a
confidential relationship).
132. In spite of the fact that the Marvin court opened its opinion with the qualifi-
cation that the Family Law Act was not being applied to unmarried cohabitants, the
broad language of footnote 22 in Marvin suggests that § 5103 is applicable to prospective
spouses as well. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 682 n.22, 557 P.2d at 121 n.22, 134
Cal. Rptr. at 830 n.22.
nology may be construed to cover prospective spouses. 3
The potentially broad application of the Marvin dicta has created
confusion as to whether antenuptial agreements might in fact be
subject to the "confidential relationship" presumption of section
5103. It is no longer clear whether parties to an antenuptial contract
deal at arm's length, as "[tihe new rule presumably intends an ad
hoc assessment of the extent to which a couple enjoys a relationship
of trust and confidence.' '13 4
As a result, prospective spouses are left with the possibility of an
unguided application of the "confidential relationship" presumption
to their contract. Even though prospective spouses are not fiduciaries
toward one another, they may be held to fiduciary standards of fair
dealing and full disclosure when entering into an antenuptial agree-
ment.135 The parties therefore "act at their peril"'1 36 if they do not
have independent legal advice, exchange lists of assets, and otherwise
deal openly.
To summarize, both the utility and popularity of antenuptial
agreements in California have been widely recognized. 37 As the en-
durance of any marriage cannot be assured, parties at least attempt
to ensure their own financial well-being when the marriage ends. 35
Unfortunately, these contractual expectations are now threatened by
legal uncertainty.
While the majority of jurisdictions presently require prospective
spouses to contract as fiduciaries so that each person's self-interest
does not outweigh the parties' mutual trust and respect, California
law in this area is clouded with confusion. In light of the Marvin
court's implicit expansion of Civil Code section 510 3,139 California's
traditional arm's-length analysis of antenuptial agreements may soon
no longer be regarded as the law. Thus, parties entering into ante-
nuptial agreements in California have neither clear guidelines for the
formation process nor certainty of enforceability.
133. 3 BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS INC. FAMILY LAw REPORTER 2617 (1977);
Branca & Steinberg, supra note 15, at 330 n.65.
134. Branca, A Practitioner's Guide to the Wages of Sin: Marvin v. Marvin, 52
L.A.B.J. 502, 504 (1977). "It may thus be necessary for each party to a nonmarital
agreement to obtain independent legal counsel, as in marital separation agreements, in
order to avoid a claim of overreaching or undue influence." Id.
135. Shapiro, supra note 12, at 80. See also Estate of Nelson, 224 Cal. App. 2d
138, 36 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1964).
136. Shapiro, supra note 12, at 80.
137. See supra notes 22, 29-30, and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
In its possible expansion of section 5103, the Marvin court has
created tremendous confusion. While the court responds to the real-
ity that not all nonmarital relationships are adversarial, it is
nonetheless beyond the court's role to suggest that "in some in-
stances" section 5103 might be extended beyond the limits estab-
lished by the legislature.
Nevertheless, Civil Code section 5103 should be amended by the
legislature in order to clarify the status of premarital contractors and
to establish better guidelines for the formation of antenuptial agree-
ments. The legislature should amend section 5103 to provide as
follows:
(a) Subject to subdivision (b), a person may enter into any transaction re-
specting property, regardless of his or her marital status.
(b) Except as provided in Sections 143, 144, and 146 of the Probate Code,
in transactions between themselves, a husband and wife or prospective
spouses are subject to the general rules which control the actions of persons
occupying confidential relations with each other, as defined by Title 8 (com-
mencing with Section 2215) of Part 4 of Division 3.140
The proposed amendment recognizes the close and trusting nature
of the prospective spouses' relationship, the public policy favoring
marriage, and the necessity of clear guidelines in negotiating and
drafting antenuptial agreements. It affords premarital contractors
the same treatment as their married counterparts, by imposing fidu-
ciary standards of full disclosure and fair dealing on the parties.
Thus, prospective spouses will know in advance what the law expects
of them when they contract with each other, and will be more cer-
tain that their contractual expectations will be fulfilled. The end re-
sult for California is a more realistic and more clearly expressed
statement of the law, which benefits not only prospective spouses but
the legal community as well.
LINDA D. FORT
140. Because, under Probate Code § 147(c), prospective spouses are exempt from
Probate Code §§ 143, 144, and 146, the proposed amendment would have the effect of
leaving the premarital contractors in the confidential relationship of Civil Code § 5103
even when they are bargaining for waiver of rights upon the death of one spouse. Thus,
as far as such waivers are concerned, prospective spouses might be placed on more than
equal footing with their married counterparts, depending, of course, on judicial interpre-
tation of all the relevant code provisions. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 140-47 (West 1985); CAL.
CIV. CODE § 5103 (West 1985). See also supra notes 113-21 and accompanying text.

